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PARENT-CIIILD TORT IMMUNITY IN OKLAHOMA:
SOME CONSIDERATIONS FOR ABANDONING
THE TOTAL IMMUNITY SHIELD
Parent-child tort immunity shields parents from suits for acts of
ordinary negligence which result in personal injury to their uneman-
cipated minor children. It similarly gives children a shield for their
acts of negligence which cause injury to their parents.' This comment
will primarily examine the parental immunity aspect of the doctrine,
from its origin to its current status in Oklahoma. This analysis will pro-
vide the basis for a suggested alteration of the Oklahoma immunity rule
to allow suits by minors against their parents for acts of ordinary negli-
gence in certain instances.
HISTORY OF PARENT-CHILD IMMUNITY
Two reasons were originally espoused by early cases2 for denying
an unemancipated minor a cause of action in tort against his parents.
First, it was asserted that a cause of action for a minor's personal injury
tort claims against his parents did not exist at common law.3 Second,
policy reasons were invoked to deny the right to bring such a cause
of action. Under this rationale, it was urged that denying a minor a
cause of action against his parents would decrease the possibility of un-
due interference with harmonious family relations.4 A suit between
1. See generally W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation,
43 HAZv. L, REv. 1030 (1930); McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL.
L. REV. 521 (1960).
2. Three leading early cases are Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885
(1891); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller,
37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
3. iSee Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); McKelvey v. McKel-
vey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788
(1905).
4. In Hewellette v. George, the Mississippi Supreme Court declared:
[S]o long as the parent is under obligation to care for, guide, and control,
and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid and comfort and obey,
no . . . action . . . can be maintained. The peace of society, and of the
families composing society, and a sound public policy, designed to subserve
the repose of families and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor
1
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parents and child for personal injury was perceived to be a challenge
to ihe authority of the parents5 and a deprivation to any other children
of the benefit. of the family fund when one child was awarded com-
pensation from that fund. Liability insurance has added a new reason
to deny a cause of action due to the danger of fraud and collusion be-
tween parent and child.7  The current status of the parent-child im-
munity doctrine shows that seventeen, states have abrogated, limited
or rejected the doctrine s while four states have not reached the question.0
The Rule in Oklahoma
The parent-child tort immunity issue is no stranger to the Okla-
homa courts. 10  Tucker v. Tucker," the leading decision in Oklahoma,
child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress
for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent. The state, through
its criminal laws, will give the minor child protection from parental violence
and wrong-doing, and this is all the child can be heard to demand.
68 Miss. at -, 9 So. at 887. See McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W.
664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
5. See, e.g., Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788, (1905).
6. Id. Additional problems in allowing such a suit were listed by the court, includ-
ing: the promotion of undesired litigation; the difficulty in drawing distinctions between
actionable and nonactionable torts; and the possibility of the parent inheriting the dam-
ages awarded the child. Id. at -, 79 P. at 789.
7. The vast majority of'personal injury suits between parent and minor child in-
volve automobile accidents. See Annot., 41 A.L.R.3rd 904 (1972). Denying a course
of action between parent and minor unemancipated child, due to the danger of fraud
and collusion, is inconsistent with denying a cause of action to prevent the disruption
of family harmony. For the family to bring a fraudulent claim, it must act harmoni-
ously, although collusively. See PRossER, supra note 1, § 122, at 868.
8. See Emmert v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 45 (D:D.C. 1969); Xaphes v. Mos-
sey, 224 F. Supp. 578 (D. Vt. 1963); Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967);
Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d
914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971); Petersen v. City and County of Honolulu,
51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1970); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241
N.E.2d 12 (1968); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1971); Plumley v. Klein,
388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972); Silesky v. Kilman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d
631 (1968); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Neb. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Briere v. Briere,
107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 56 NJ. 500,
267 A.2d 490 (1970); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297
N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967); Falco v. Pados,
444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190
(1971); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
The Supreme Court of Texas has indicated in Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d
928 (Tex. 1971), that it may abrogate or limit the parent-child immunity doctrine
when presented with the issue. See Comment, The Balance Between Individual Rights
and Family Preservation: The Future of the Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine in
Texas, 4 ST. MARY's L.i. 48 (1972).
9. The four states that have not considered the issue are Idaho, Kansas, South
Dakota and Utah. Comment, The Demise of Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 12 WIL-
LAMETrE L.J. 605, 606 n.10 (1976). -
10. See, e.g., Markham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 464 F.2d 703 (10th
2
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denied plaintiff recovery from his parents for personal injuries suffered
due to their alleged negligence. Tucker was based on the premises
that at common law there was no cause of action agianst one's parents
and that public policy precluded the action. The court therefore con-
cluded that no action existed in Oklahoma until expressly created by
the legislature, as had previously been done in regard to children's
property rights.12
The rationale of Tucker appears to be faulty in at least two re-
spects. First, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had earlier held that the
statutes giving minors the power to sue parents in regard to property
matters were merely declaratory, not in derogation, of the common
law. 3 Furthermore, instead of expressly banning these personal injury
actions, the common law simply was not confronted with the issue.14
Finally, it should be noted that Tucker involved an action, instituted
after the minor had reached majority, for injuries received during mi-
nority.15 Thus, minority does not confer an immunity which disappears
when the child reaches majority or is emancipated; the cause of action
is not tolled until the child's disability ends.1 6  The court's focus is on
the status of the parties at the time the wrong was sustained.17
Exceptions to the Immunity Rule in Oklahoma
The rule banning parents as possible defendants of their children's
personal injury actions is not absolute. Some of the common ex-
Cir. 1972); Workman v. Workman, 498 P.2d 1384 (Okla. 1972); Stewart v. Harris,
434 P.2d 902 (Okla. 1967); Hale v. Hale, 426 P.2d 681 (Okla. 1967); Wooden v.
Hale, 426 P.2d 679 (Okla. 1967); Hill v. Graham, 424 P.2d 35 (Okla. 1967); Hampton
v. Clendinning, 416 P.2d 617 (Okla. 1966); Tucker v. Tucker, 395 P.2d 67 (Okla.
1964); Van Wart v. Cook, 557 P.2d 1161 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976); Bassett v. Bassett,
521 P.2d 434 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974). All of these cases involved automobile accidents.
11. 395 P.2d 67 (Okla. 1964).
12. These statutes, [citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 7 (1961) and OKLA. STAT.
tit. 10, § 8 (1961), which provide that parents, qua parents, have no control
over their children's property] and others similar to them, are the basis of
the child's right to sue the parent when property rights are involved. There
are no comparable statutes plainly indicating that the minor may sue the par-
ent in tort.
Id. at 69.
13. In re Guardianship of Hight, 194 Okla. 214, 148 P.2d 475 (1944).
14. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 122, at 865.
15. 395 P.2d at 69-70.
16. Id. See Hampton v. Clendinning, 416 P.2d 617 (Okla. 1966). See also Note,
Torts: Estate and Employer Liability for Ordinary Negligence to the Child of a Primary
Tortfeasor in Oklahoma, 20 OKLA. L. Rnv. 93 (1967).
17. Cf. Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967) (taking contrary approach
in face of a statutory scheme similar to that of Oklahoma).
1977]
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ceptions' include wanton or gross negligence,' 9 intentional torts,20
majority2' and emancipation. 22  The parental shield has also been ex-
tended to those in loco parentis to the child;23 however at least one
Oklahoma court has permitted an action between a minor and an em-
ployer, where the employee, who was primarily liable for the child's in-
juries, stood in loco parentis to the plaintiff.24 This result may be ex-
plainable by noting that the conduct of the employee was characterized
by the court as wanton or gross negligence.25 As a result, the extent
of this exception to parental tort immunity is unclear.
Another potential exception to tort immunity is presented by the
Oklahoma wrongful death statute. The statute provides:
When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or
omission of another, the personal representative of the for-
mer may maintain an action therefor against the latter . . .
if the former might have maintained an action had he lived,
against the latter . . . The damages must inure to the
exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and children, if
18. See PROSSER, supra note 1, § 122, at 866-67.
19. See Hill v. Graham, 424 P.2d 35 (Okla. 1967) (gross negligence was alleged
but the court did not find the case to be one of gross negligence); Patsy Oil & Gas
Co. v. Odom, 186 Okla. 116, 96 P.2d 302 (1939) (discussed at notes 24-25 intfra and
accompanying text).
20. While Oklahoma has not confronted the issue of parent-child tort immunity
involving an intentional tort, recognizing an exception to the general immunity rule
in this situation would be in line with the position taken in the majority of states.
See generally Annot., 41 A.L.R.3rd 904 (1972).
21. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 10 (1971); Bassett v. Bassett, 521 P.2d 434 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1974).
22. See, e.g., Workman v. Workman, 498 P.2d 1384 (Okla. 1972); Tucker v.
Tucker, 395 P.2d 67 (Okla. 1964).
23. Workman v. Workman, 498 P.2d 1384 (Okla. 1972); Wooden v. Hale, 426
P.2d 679 (Okla. 1967); Van Wart v. Cook, 557 P.2d 1161 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
All of these cases involved stepparents.
"The term 'in loco parentis' means in the place of a parent, and a 'person in
loco parentis' may be defined as one who has assumed the status and obligations of
a parent without a formal adoption." 498 P.2d at 1386 (citation omitted).
24. Patsy Oil & Gas Co. v. Odom, 186 Okla. 116, 96 P.2d 302 (1939).
25. It is questionable whether the same result would occur if only ordinary negli-
gence was involved. It should be noted that if the minor child is successful in his
suit, the employer may have an indemnity action against the employee who stands
in loco parentis to the plaintiff child. PRossER, supra note 1, § 51, at 311. As a
result, the child would be recovering damages from the party in loco parentis by a
circuitous route.
In Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Beers, 185 Okla. 331, 91 P.2d 777 (1939), plaintiff,
after reaching majority, sued for personal injuries sustained when she was a minor.
The accident had occurred on property which her father operated for the defendant,
his employer. Verdict for the plaintiff was reversed on grounds other than parent-
child immunity; it appears that this issue was never raised.
4
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any, or next of kin; to be distributed in the same manner as
personal property of the deceased.26
To determine if a wrongful death action resulting from negligence can
be maintained, a court must decide if the deceased, had he lived, could
have maintained an action against the tortfeasor. If the deceased is
the child of the defendant, neither the natural parent nor the party
in loco parentis to that child23 can maintain a wrongful death action,
since the child would have been unable to sue had he lived.2 9 Similar
reasoning would deny a cause of action if the defendant stood in loco
parentis to the dead child. Yet if both parents are dead, due to the
negligence of one of them, an action for the wrongful death of the inno-
cent parent could be maintained by the child since Oklahoma has
eliminated interspousal tort immunity.3" Likewise, if the tortfeasor
parent is still alive, an unemancipated child should be able to maintain
an action on behalf of the deceased parent for wrongful death negli-
gently inflicted by the surviving parent, since the deceased parent could
have sued the other spouse had he survived.3"
The hypothetical above clearly presents the dilemma faced by the
Oklahoma courts. An action for wrongful death is intended, in part,
to compensate the plaintiff for damages he has suffered by the wrong-
ful death of the decedent. 32  Thus, if the child maintained an action
successfully, he would recover damages from the living parent for in-
juries caused to the child by the parent; yet the purpose of the parent-
child tort immunity is to deny the parent or child relief from the other's
negligence.33 In another context, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
attempted to justify its adherence to the rule of immunity in face of
legislation which appears to contradict the rule's purpose. It noted that
it would be error to "conclude that Oklahoma was legislatively pioneer-
ing in the right of a child to sue its parents for injuries sustained as
26. OK A. STAT. tit. 12, § 1053 (1971) (emphasis added).
27. Hale v. Hale, 426 P.2d 681 (Okla. 1967).
28. Cf. Hill v. Graham, 424 P.2d 35 (Okla. 1967) (stepmother attempted to main-
tain an action against an unemancipated minor for the wrongful death of the child's
father).
29. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1053 (1971). Hale v. Hale, 426 P.2d 681 (Okla. 1967).
30. Stewart v. Harris, 434 P.2d 902 (Okla. 1967).
31. See id.
32. PRossEa, supra note 1, § 127, at 903-04; 1 S. SPEISER, REcoVERY FOR WRONGFUL
DEATH 28-29 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as SPEIsER]. See Woods, Comparative
Negligence in Oklahoma-A New Experience, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1975); Note,
Wrongful Death and Survival Actions, 6 OKLA. L. REv. 384 (1953).
33. Speiser believes that allowing the action is the better decision since an opposite
approach can only be accomplished by reading a limitation into the statute that is
not expressly present. SPEISER, supra note 32, at 644-46.
1977]
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a result of ordinary negligence. '3 4 However, if the court's observation
is applied to the wrongful death statute, further conflicts are created
since that statute, according to the court, "is clear and unambiguous
and . . . [applies] to actions which could have been maintained by
deceased had he lived."'3 5 Since, in the hypothetical under considera-
tion, the deceased comes within the terms of the statute, the court, if
and when the issue is presented, must decide whether to make a statute
less "clear and unambigious" in order to further a doctrine which needs
drastic reevaluation.
The rationale of Tucker,86 which denies a cause of action for par-
ent-child torts unless expressly created by the legislature, is an in-
flexible and narrow view of the functions of the judiciary. Besides its
inaccuracy, 37 it provides little opportunity for a meaningful reshaping
of the nature and extent of parent-child immunity. However, the court
has recently fashioned a more flexible tool to reevaluate the current
status of the law.
Workman v. Workman: An Opportunity for Meaningful Analysis
In Workman v. Workman,38 plaintiff mother sued defendant hus-
band-stepfather for the wrongful deaths of two of her children and to
recover damages for personal injuries that she and her surviving child
received as a result of the defendant's negligence. While the Okla-
homa court invoked the parent-child immunity shield to dismiss certain
aspects of the action, 9 the significance of the opinion lies in the ra-
tionale espoused by the court in arriving at this conclusion. It noted
that "[ihe reason for the rule of immunity is that public policy and
the best interests of society forbids the right of an unemancipated minor
child to appear in court and assert a claim for personal injuries suffered
at the hands of the parent. '40
Denying the cause of action because it did not exist at common
law was not mentioned by the court. Thus, the court seems to have
34. Tucker v. Tucker, 395 P.2d 67, 69 (Okla. 1964) (discussing the scope of OKLA.
CONsT. art. 2, § 6; OKLA. STAT. tit. 23 § 3 (1961); and OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 1
(1961)). See notes 10-17 supra and accompanying text.
35. Stewart v. Harris, 434 P.2d 902, 903-04 (Okla. 1967).
36. See notes 10-17 supra and accompanying text.
37. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
38. 498 P.2d 1384 (Okla. 1972).
39. Apparently the mother could recover for the personal injuries that she received
as a result of her husband's negligence. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
40. 498 P.2d at 1387.
[Vol. 12:545
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switched its primary basis for denying the action to the notion of public
policy. Unfortunately, however, the court's treatment of public policy
was inadequate. Instead of a conclusory approach to the problem, the
court should have considered the policies that were promoted by theimmunity rule. In addition, attention should have been given to the
aspects of public policy which were violated or hampered by the exist-
ence of the rule. 41
Denying a parent-child cause of action on public policy grounds
is based on the idea that such a rule will decrease family conflicts, pro-
mote discipline and prevent depletion of family funds. 42  In the ma-
jority of cases, where liability insurance is presumably present,43 family
harmony will not be disrupted if the action is successful since the child
will receive compensation for his injuries from a source not directly
connected to the family fund. If the action is not allowed, however,
the child may be deprived of the chance to obtain compensation for
his injuries from the independent source.44 Thus, while the rule may
prevent disruptions from an intense legal battle over the liability of one
family member to another, it completely ignores the potential disrup-
tion that may result when the family fund45 is unnecessarily depleted
41. [I]t must be recognized that we are not here concerned with a problem
of statutory construction but rather with a judge-made rule. The doctrine
was advanced by the American courts with no support from the common law.
It was formulated, not by legislative enactment propounding an expressed pub-
lic policy, but by the courts who asserted their conception of what public
policy was.
Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family-Husband & Wife-Parent
& Child, 25 Mo. L. REv. 152, 193 (1961) (footnotes omitted).
42. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text.
43. It should be recalled that all actions between parent and unemancipated minor
child in Oklahoma have involved automobile accidents. See note 10 supra. Presumably,
the parties involved were insured. See Special Committee on Automobile Accident Rep-
arations, Report, 94 A.B.A. 559, 576 (1969). Since Oklahoma now requires every
owner of a motor vehicle to maintain liability insurance, OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 7-
601 (Supp. 1976), perhaps the court will look more favorably on the view of Judge
Fuld:
New York now requires automobile liability insurance. I recognize that
the presence of insurance does not create liability but, since it was fear that
domestic peace and tranquility would be destroyed and the family disrupted
which gave rise to adoption of the family immunity doctrine, its existence
is a factor to be taken into account in considering whether or not the doctrine
should be perpetuated .... Insurance against accidents, once solely a con-
tract of indemnity, a means of reimbursement for the doer of the wrong, has
lost much of its ancient quality and has in effect become insurance for the
protection of the sufferer. The vast majority of accidents of this type are
now defended by insurance companies in the names of nominal defendants.
Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, -, 174 N.E.2d 718, 722-23, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35,
41 (1961) (dissenting opinion) (citations omitted).
44. See Special Committee on Automobile Accident Reparations, Report, 94 A.B.A.
REP. 559, 616 (1969).
45. Any earnings of an unemancipated child must be considered as part of the
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because the proceeds from liability insurance cannot be reached. 0
Moreover, when the parent is injured by the child's negligence, not
only must compensation for the injuries come out of the family fund,
but the fund is also diminished by an interruption in the earning power
of the injured parent.
Of course there are times when the tort committed between par-
ent and unemancipated minor child is not covered by liability insur-
ance. Where the unavailability of insurance forces compensation for
the injury out of the family fund, the likelihood of disrupting family
harmony obviously increases. However, the danger of disruption of
family harmony has never prevented awarding compensation to a
stranger injured by the tort of a family member. Liability attaches in
such cases without regard to the effect that a lack of insurance will have
on the family fund. Consideration must also be given to the exceptions
to the rule of parent-child immunity. Since public policy considera-
tions of family harmony do not prevent suits between parent and child
where property rights, gross negligence or intentional torts are in-
volved,47 it seems inconsistent that these same considerations should
operate to deny an action when mere negligence is involved.48
Finally, an examination must be made of the public policies that
are violated by the existence of the immunity rule. The most funda-
mental policy violated is contained in the Oklahoma Constitution:
"The courts of justice of the State shall be open to every person, and
speedy and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for every in-
jury to person, property, or reputation; and right and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice. 40  Exceptions
to this declaration cannot be justified by the argument that the constitu-
tional provision was drafted at a time when "it apparently had not oc-
curred to any one that a child could sue its parent in . . . tort."' 0 The
family fund since his parents are legally entitled to them. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10,
§ 5 (Supp. 1976). Thus the family fund may also be diminished by the loss of the
minor's earnings during the time he is disabled.
46. The American Bar Association has concluded that the desirability of compen-
sating the minor outweighs the danger of fraud and collusion in the family context.
Special Committee on Automobile Accident Reparations, Report, 94 A.B.A. REP. 559,
616 (1969).
47. See notes 13, 18-23 supra and accompanying text.
48. The potential for family disruptions when intentional torts are involved may
be greater in instances where the defendant is subject to the sanction of punitive dam-
ages. See OKLA. STAr. tit. 23, § 9 (1971).
49. OxLA. CoNsT. art. 2, § 6. See also OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 3 (1971); OxL.
STAT. tit. 76, § 1 (1971).
50. Tucker v. Tucker, 395 P.2d 67, 69 (Okla. 1964).
[Vol. 12:545
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existence of exceptions to parent-child tort immunity refutes the basis
of this argument.
The final policy violated by the immunity shield occurs in the
wrongful death context. To deny an action for wrongful death under
the circumstances previously noted would create uncertainty and con-
fusion in the application of a statutory scheme which the court has de-
clared to be "clear and unambiguous" in its application. 51
The force of these considerations demands that the court seriously
evaluate the need for a substantial modification of the immunity rule.
The following section offers a solution which protects both the interests
of the family unit and its individual members.
REASONABLENESS AS A STANDARD FOR IMMUNITY
The parent rule of parental immunity should be replaced with a
rule which has as its basis the concept of the reasonably prudent parent.
This standard recognizes that parents should have more discretion than
third parties regarding their conduct toward their children, yet permits
recovery from them when their conduct falls below the standard of care
required for the protection of their children. The standard advocated
is that adopted by the California Supreme Court in Gibson v. Gibson.52
Overruling the traditional immunity rule for ordinary negligence, the
court formulated the following test as a guide: "What would an ordi-
narily reasonable and prudent parent have done in similar circum-
stances? ' 53 In the event that the parent's actions fall below this stand-
ard, the action proceeds as any other negligence case "but viewed in
light of the parental role."54 This test respects the discretion and au-
thority of parents, while providing protection to the child when the par-
ent strays from his proper function.
The California rule offers a further advantage in that it is more
consistent with the public policy of Oklahoma. This consistency is best
demonstrated by focusing on the criminal and civil proceedings avail-
able in Oklahoma against parents who do not perform their parental
duties. Parents who fail to provide the proper degree of care to their
children may face criminal sanctions or the termination of their par-
51. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
52. 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
53. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (emphasis in original).
54. Id.
1977]
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ental rights.55  While both criminal and civil remedies can be invoked
to insure that children receive maintenance, care and education, sanc-
tions are imposed only if the parent acts unreasonably. The law rec-
ognizes, for example, the need to discipline minor children. As a re-
sult, the Oklahoma legislature has provided that the exercise of reason-
able force against the child is not unlawful
[w]hen committed by a parent . . . in the exercise of a law-
ful authority to restrain or correct his child . . . provided
restraint or correction has been rendered necessary by the
misconduct of such child . . . or by his refusal to obey the
lawful command of such parent . . . and the force or vio-
lence used is reasonable in manner and moderate in degree."0
Thus, Oklahoma has provided that a parent cannot be held crim-
inally liable when disciplining his child if the force used "is reasonable
in manner and moderate in degree." The parent is exercising lawful
authority and providing proper care if he is reasonable in disciplining
his child; he is criminally liable only if he intentionally uses unreason-
able force when disciplining his child.
Likewise, the parent's duty to care for the child is subject to a
standard of reasonableness. Thus, in determining whether a parent
has fulfilled his obligations, the court will consider whether the par-
ticular care or conduct involved is of the same quality as that rendered
by "an ordinarily prudent person, solicitous for the welfare of his
child."' 57 This standard is virtually identical to the California standard
enunciated in Gibson.58
The duties imposed upon a parent under Oklahoma law are
similar to the areas in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Goller
v. White,59 held that the parent has immunity from a suit by his minor
unemancipated child. These areas include: "(1) where the alleged
negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child;
and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordi-
nary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing,
housing, medical and dental services, and other care."8 0
The California Supreme Court has expressly rejected this test of
55. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 852 (Supp. 1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 1101,
1130 (Supp. 1976).
56. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 643 (1971).
57. Owens v. State, 6 Okla. Crim. 110, 113-14, 116 P. 345, 346 (1911).
58. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
59. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
60. Id. at -, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
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parental immunity because it found "intolerable the notion that if a par-
ent can succeed in bringing himself within the 'safety' of parental im-
munity, he may act negligently with impunity."'61 For example, if the
parent, with adequate financial resources, negligently fails to provide
dental services to correct his child's protruding teeth, the parent would
presumably be liable to the child under the California test. Under the
Wisconsin test, however, the parent would not be liable to his un-
emancipated minor child for his negligent failure to correct the child's
protruding teeth since the act involved an exercise of ordinary parental
discretion, rather than an exercise of reasonable parental discretion.
Should an Oklahoma court ever be faced with this hypothetical situa-
tion, it presumably would look to see if "an ordinarily prudent person,
solicitous for the welfare of his child"62 would provide dental services
to correct the child's protruding teeth. The result should be the same
as that reached under the California test.
CONCLUSION
The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that no cause of action
existed for ordinary negligence between parent and unemancipated
child because no such action existed at common law. The supreme
court held that only the legislature could give a child the right to sue
his parent, and vice versa, since such actions would be in derogation
of the common law. The court seems to have abandoned this rationale
today, relying solely on social policy to deny a cause of action between
parent and child. As a result, the supreme court's conception of social
policy is suspect, since the policy is riddled with exceptions. It is time
for Oklahoma to consider abandoning the immunity rule and substitut-
ing a rule giving the parent immunity only if he has acted as a reason-
ably prudent parent.
Oklahoma adheres to the reasonableness standard when it con-
siders whether criminal sanctions should be imposed or whether pa-
rental rights should be terminated. To avoid inconsistency and to pro-
mote the welfare of the child, as well as of the family and society, this
standard should govern the minor's right to bring suit against his par-
ents.
Mitchell E. Ignatoff
61. 3 Cal. 3d at 922, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
62. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
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